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This article examines the laws that apply to encryption in New Zealand. Specifically, it 
analyses the different types of law that constitute an encryption legal framework in the 
country, namely: export control, substantive cybercrime, criminal procedure, human rights, 
and information security and data protection. The article then utilises the encryption laws and 
legal framework to evaluate a proposal by the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to regulate the 
use of end-to-end encryption in messaging services. The article concludes that the proposal is 
incompatible with the country’s encryption legal framework. 
 
1. The encryption dilemma  
 Encryption is a key technology in today’s network information society. Many 
everyday activities depend on or involve encryption whether it is people using internet 
banking, shopping online, browsing the web, sending private messages, or protecting their 
electronic data and devices. Encryption is considered essential for information security and 
cybersecurity.1 There is general consensus among many stakeholders, including government, 
that this technology is integral to safeguarding the security, privacy and other rights and 
interests of persons in a digitally connected environment.2 The dilemma though is that the 
ability of encryption to provide secrecy and security of information and communications can 
become a significant threat or hindrance to public order and safety when it is used for illicit 
or criminal means and purposes. There have been many attempts and proposals to regulate 
encryption since the so-called Crypto Wars in the 1990s when the US Government 
unsuccessfully sought to formally enact new laws and regulation that prohibit or control the 
general development and distribution of encryption technology.3 With the ever-increasing 
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ubiquity and embeddedness of computers, data and networks across the world today, 
proposals to regulate encryption have become more frequent as well. The Five Eyes 
intelligence alliance composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States have made joint international statements that call for stricter regulation of 
encryption, including greater cooperation from technology companies that develop and use 
encryption in their widely used products and services.4 Recently, the Five Eyes alliance, 
together with India and Japan, released an international statement on end-to-end encryption 
where they called on technology companies to design or modify their encrypted messaging 
services to permit law enforcement to intercept and gain access to decrypted or plaintext 
copies of users’ communications.5 This proposal was opposed by technology companies, 
cybersecurity experts and civil society organisations.6  
This and other government proposals to regulate encryption are often critiqued on the 
ground that governments do not appear to understand the technology of encryption or, despite 
having sufficient knowledge, persist in their instrumentalist approaches to regulating this 
technology.7 Aside from this perceived lack of technical understanding, government attempts 
to regulate encryption can be further criticised for being seemingly oblivious or unaware of 
the fact that there are already existing laws that regulate encryption to a significant degree. 
Problematic, infeasible or misguided proposals to regulate encryption can be avoided if there 
is greater recognition of these laws that make up an overarching encryption legal framework.  
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The principal aim of this article is to systematically set out and examine the existing 
laws and legal framework of encryption that already regulate the development, access to and 
use of encryption in New Zealand. Further, the article explains how this overarching 
encryption legal framework is based on well-established legal powers, procedures and rights. 
This means that any proposal to regulate encryption in general or specifically should be 
cognisant of or conform to this existing legal framework. Otherwise, the proposed regulation 
would either have to (a) overhaul all or a significant portion of the encryption laws and legal 
framework discussed below or (b) come into conflict with multifarious laws and potentially 
even breach the country’s international obligations.  
 An examination of New Zealand law is significant because, as a member of the Five 
Eyes alliance, the country’s laws and policies on encryption may potentially influence or 
reveal how the other members decide to regulate this technology. This article is also relevant 
in that not much has been written about encryption laws in New Zealand compared to the 
other Five Eyes countries. The article’s description and explication of the applicable New 
Zealand laws can also be used as a basis to compare and contrast the encryption laws of the 
Five Eyes members. Further, a legal analysis of the proposed regulation of end-to-end 
encryption and whether or not it fits with New Zealand laws can provide useful insights for 
other jurisdictions as well.  
The article’s presentation and analysis proceed as follows. Part 2 provides a brief 
overview of technical elements of encryption. Parts 3 and 4 examine, respectively, the two 
general categories of law that apply to encryption: (1) substantive and procedural criminal 
and cybercrime laws and (2) human rights and cybersecurity laws. Part 3 focuses specifically 
on export control, substantive cybercrime, and criminal procedure laws, while Part 4 delves 
into the areas of human rights, information security, and data protection laws. In Part 5, the 
encryption legal framework is used as a standard or criteria to assess the legitimacy and 
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viability of the proposed regulation of end-to-end encryption in New Zealand. It discusses the 
main approaches the proposal to regulate end-to-end encryption may take and explains why 
they are not in line with the country’s current encryption laws and legal framework. Part 6 
closes with a short reflection on the value of utilising the encryption legal framework as a 
guide for developing encryption laws and policies. 
2. Encryption, encryption keys and encrypted data  
Before examining the relevant laws, it would be useful to understand the technical 
elements and aspects of encryption. Encryption is basically a technology that transforms 
information or data into ciphers or code for purposes of ensuring its confidentiality, integrity 
and authenticity.8 It achieves these purposes by converting plaintext (unencoded, 
comprehensible information) into ciphertext (encoded, unintelligible or indecipherable 
information) using an encryption algorithm and an encryption key.9 The reverse process of 
transforming the ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption and requires a decryption 
key (which may be the same or different from the encryption key).10  
A key is basically a unique string of information such as a large random number that 
is used in the encoding or decoding process. When the encryption and decryption keys are 
one and the same, this is known as symmetric encryption.11 Symmetric encryption is often 
used to secure and keep private stored data or data at rest (e.g., a message saved on a 
phone).12 If the encryption and decryption keys are different, there is asymmetric 
encryption.13 Asymmetric encryption is generally used for communications or data in motion 
(for instance, a message in the process of being transmitted to another person).14 A common, 
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widely-used example of asymmetric encryption is public key cryptography, which utilises a 
key pair consisting of a public key (used for encryption) and a private key (for decryption).15  
End-to-end encryption is a specific kind of encryption where the communications 
between two parties are fully encrypted: from creation, transmission and receipt of the 
message. End-to-end encryption is distinctive in that the communicating parties have 
exclusive possession of their private or decryption keys. The messaging company, service 
provider or network operator do not have access to the keys. Further, even though messaging 
or service providers could potentially intercept, record or copy the encrypted messages on 
their services, the collected encrypted messages would be unintelligible to them since they 
are unable to decrypt the messages without the decryption keys.  
3. Substantive and procedural criminal and cybercrime laws 
3.1 Export control and substantive cybercrime laws  
Export control and cybercrime laws are two types of law that directly affect the 
distribution and development of encryption. Export control laws cover dual-use goods and 
technologies such as encryption, which may be used for both civilian and military purposes.16 
The Wassenaar Arrangement is one of the major international instruments that require the 
implementation of export controls on dual-use technologies.17 The Wassenaar Arrangement 
has been implemented in New Zealand through customs and excise laws18 and pertinent 
Customs Export Prohibition Orders (CEPO).19 The CEPOs allow for the publication of the 
New Zealand Strategic Goods List (NZSGL), which details the technologies that are subject 
to export restrictions.20 
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The NZSGL effectively mirrors the Wassenaar Arrangement, which states that if an 
encryption product meets all of the following then it is not subject to export control: (a) 
generally available to the public by being sold, without restriction, from stock at retail selling 
points; (b) the cryptographic functionality cannot easily be changed by the user; or (c) 
designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier.21 
Many everyday goods and services employ encryption technologies that are exempt from the 
Wassenaar Arrangement. For example, copy-protection mechanisms for video streaming sites 
like Netflix, digital rights management (DRM) on DVD players and e-books, virtual private 
networks (VPNs), secure internet protocols (HTTPS), and email encryption are exempt from 
export license requirements. It should also be pointed out that these export control rules only 
apply to the export of encryption.22 There are no restrictions on the importation of encryption 
into the country. People living in New Zealand can therefore freely access, download and use 
encryption technologies from abroad such as widely used encryption tools such VeraCrypt, 
OpenPGP and Signal. Since most encryption technologies are developed outside of the 
country and publicly available online, it is difficult to control access to and use of encryption 
domestically.  
Cybercrime laws are also relevant to encryption. The Crimes Act 1961 is the principal 
substantive cybercrime statute in New Zealand, particularly sections 248-252.23 The 
provision that is most pertinent to encryption is section 251, which is the crime of misuse of 
devices.24 Pursuant to section 251, it is illegal for a person to make, sell, distribute or possess 
software or other information for committing a cybercrime such as unauthorised access.25 
The Crimes Act 1961 states that it is illegal to provide or possess ‘any software or other 
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information that would enable another person to access a computer system without 
authorisation’26 for either of the following reasons: (1) ‘the sole or principal use of which he 
or she knows to be the commission of an offence’ or  (2) ‘that he or she promotes as being 
useful for the commission of an offence (whether or not he or she also promotes it as being 
useful for any other purpose), knowing or being reckless as to whether it will be used for the 
commission of an offence’.27 Section 251 applies to encryption technologies such as 
encryption software because they can be used to facilitate or hide criminal activities. 
However, since encryption is dual-use technology, it is only a crime if the encryption is 
primarily designed or promoted to commit illegal acts.28 This position is confirmed by 
reference to article 6 of the Convention on Cybercrime, on which section 251 is based. 
According to the drafters of the Convention, the crime of misuse of devices is only 
committed in cases where the technologies ‘are objectively designed, or adapted, primarily 
for the purpose of committing an offence. This alone will usually exclude dual-use devices’ 
(i.e., those can be used for both legitimate and illicit purposes). 29 Thus, the development and 
distribution of encryption is generally not prohibited nor penalised under the law. 
3.2 Criminal procedure laws  
Criminal procedure law is another type of law that exerts a significant influence on 
how encryption is developed, accessed and used. Based on the principle of lawful access, law 
enforcement officers (including those from regulatory agencies) have the power to access 
encrypted data if the proper process is followed. Such authorisation typically comes via 
search, seizure and surveillance warrants and other investigatory procedures. These law 
enforcement powers and procedures are generally provided for in the Search and Surveillance 
Act 2012, which represents a consolidation of New Zealand’s search and surveillance 
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framework into a single, overarching statute. Aside from the police, law enforcement officers 
at public agencies granted powers to ensure compliance with regulatory regimes are 
conferred search powers via their governing statute. For example, New Zealand Customs 
Officers are conferred search powers in the Customs and Excise Act 2018, Wine Officers via 
the Wine Act 2003, and Tax Commissioners through the Tax Administration Act 1994. There 
are over seventy such governing statutes.30 
3.2.1 Search and seizure 
The power of search and seizure applies to encryption. Encrypted computers and 
devices can be physically seized and inspected, while encrypted stored data can be accessed, 
searched and copied. Under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012, ‘search power’ 
encompasses the authority of police and other law enforcement officers to enter, search, 
seize, inspect and examine ‘any place, vehicle, or other things, or to search a person’.31 The 
search of a particular place, vehicle or thing ‘extends to the search of any computer system or 
data storage device located in whole or in part at the place, vehicle or thing’.32 Law 
enforcement officers also have the power to access a computer or stored data (i.e., ‘use any 
reasonable measures to access a computer system or other data storage device located (in 
whole or in part) at the place, vehicle, or other thing if any intangible material that is the 
subject of the search may be in that computer system or other device’).33 In relation to 
computers and computer data, a search involves the ability to access, ‘seek, read, inspect or 
review data’,34 while seizure is ‘to take away the physical medium upon which data or 
information is recorded, or to make and retain a copy of such data or information’.35 A 
                                                        
30 See Law Commission, Review of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (NZLC IP40, 2016), para 1.11. 
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specific type of data that is crucial for gaining access to computers and stored data is access 
information. Access information is defined as including ‘codes, passwords, and encryption 
keys, and any related information that enables access to a computer system or any other data 
storage device’.36  
 In addition to the general search and seizure power, law enforcement officers have the 
authority ‘to request any person to assist with the entry and search’.37 Moreover, under 
section 130 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012, they have the power to require a user, 
owner, or provider of a computer system to provide information including access 
information. Section 130 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 states:  
A person exercising a search power in respect of any data held in a computer 
system or other data storage device may require a specified person to provide 
access information and other information or assistance that is reasonable and 
necessary to allow the person exercising the search power to access that data.38 
 
With regard to scope, section 130 covers both users (‘a user of a computer system or other 
data storage device or an Internet site who has relevant knowledge of that system, device, or 
site;’) and providers (‘a person who provides an Internet service or maintains an Internet site 
and who holds access information’).39 This means that the power to require provision of 
necessary information is not limited to users who are subject to or involved in the search, but 
also third parties providers such as website hosts, cloud computing companies and online 
intermediaries located or doing business in New Zealand. In section 130, the term ‘user’ is 
broadly defined and may include even those who are suspected of or charged with the 
commission of an offence.40 Under subsection (1) of section 130, suspects or accused persons 
can be ordered to divulge their passwords, encryption and decryption keys and other access 
information as part of a search. Subsection (2) though provides an exception based on the 
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privilege against self-incrimination that ‘a specified person may not be required… to give any 
information tending to incriminate the person’.41 However, subsection (2) is subject to a 
further qualification in subsection (3), which states that:  
Subsection (2) does not prevent a person exercising a search power from 
requiring a specified person to provide information or providing assistance that 
is reasonable and necessary to allow the person exercising the search power to 
access data held in, or accessible from, a computer system or other data storage 
device that contains or may contain information tending to incriminate the 
specified person.42 
 
While subsection (3) seems to contradict or nullify the express intent of subsection (2), 
subsection (4) also explicitly states that the preceding ‘Subsections (2) and (3) are subject to 
subpart 5 of this Part (which relates to privilege and confidentiality)’, which confirms the 
protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.43 In spite of the confusing language, a 
reasonable interpretation of section 130 would be that a user can refuse to provide 
information if it will incriminate or tend to incriminate that person. Section 130 is not as 
problematic when it comes to providers since they normally act as third parties so they are 
not themselves involved in the crime being investigated and the privilege against self-
incrimination is not generally available to them. The privilege against self-incrimination is 
discussed in more detail later in the article. 
 Customs officers similarly have powers to search and seize as well as to demand 
access to encrypted devices and stored data at the border and other ports of entry. Pursuant to 
the Customs and Excise Act 2018, they can conduct an initial search or a full search of an 
electronic device or storage medium.44 Customs officers can further require a user to allow 
access or provide access information to an electronic device so that it can be searched.45 
Compared to the Search and Surveillance Act 2012, a user is defined more narrowly under 
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the Customs and Excise Act 2018 as it only refers to ‘a person who owns, leases, possesses, 
or controls a device (or an employee of such a person) and who has relevant knowledge of 
the device.’46 If a user has no reasonable excuse for failing to provide access information, 
then that person can be liable for a fine not exceeding $5,000.47 Customs can also retain the 
device to arrange to gain access to it,48 and the device may be condemned to the Crown, 
destroyed, or returned to the user at the court’s discretion.49 
 It is evident from the above discussion that law enforcement officers have significant 
powers in relation to encryption. They have the power to search, seize and even break or 
break into encryption, encrypted data and encrypted computers. They also have the authority 
to compel the disclosure of passwords, encryption and decryption keys, and other access 
information from specific persons (including third party providers) as part of a search. With 
regard to border searches, Customs can similarly search and seizure electronic devices and 
require access information under specific conditions.  
 3.2.2 Surveillance  
 The power of surveillance is relevant to encryption, particularly with regard to the 
interception of encrypted communications. Surveillance power is regulated under the 
surveillance device regime of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012.50 The surveillance 
device regime permits the use of interception devices to monitor and record communications. 
In addition, a surveillance device warrant authorises law enforcement officers to: ‘use any 
assistance that is reasonable in the circumstances’; use ‘any force that is reasonable in the 
circumstances to do so, in order to install, maintain, or remove the surveillance device, or to 
access and use electricity to power the surveillance device’; and obtain ‘the content of a 
                                                        
46 ibid s 228(5). 
47 ibid s 228(8). 
48 ibid s 228(9). 
49 ibid s 228(11). 
50 See Search and Surveillance Act 2012, ss 45-64. 
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telecommunication’ and ‘direct the relevant network operator to provide call associated 
data’.51  
The Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013 (TICSA) is 
another statute that is relevant to the surveillance of encrypted communications. The TICSA 
imposes obligations on network operators, which are defined as the owners, controllers or 
operators of public telecommunications networks.52 Network operators have the duty to 
ensure that their public telecommunications networks and telecommunications services have 
full interception capability.53 Full interception capability means a surveillance agency is able 
to obtain from a network operator’s system the contents of the telecommunication in a useable 
format and the call associated data of a telecommunication.54 The TICSA also applies to 
service providers, which are defined as ‘any person who, from within our outside New 
Zealand, provides or makes available in New Zealand a telecommunications service to an 
end-user’.55 Under the TICSA, both network operators and service providers are required to 
provide assistance to a surveillance agency. This entails assisting the surveillance agency 
identify, intercept and obtain both the content of the telecommunication and the metadata 
associated with the telecommunication at the time of the transmission of the 
telecommunication or as close to that time as is practicable, without unduly interfering with 
any telecommunication not authorised to be intercepted.56 It should be noted though that 
network operators and service providers are only required to decrypt their users’ encrypted 
communication if they provided the means of encryption.57 Otherwise, they have no 
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obligation under the law to ensure that a surveillance agency has the capability to decrypt 
such communications.58 
In sum, law enforcement officers possess the power to use interception devices to 
monitor and collect encrypted and non-encrypted communications, call associated data and 
metadata using the surveillance device regime provided in the Search and Surveillance Act 
2012. Such collection may be carried out by law enforcement officers themselves or with the 
assistance of network operators or service providers. In addition, network operators are 
mandated to ensure that their networks are interception ready or accessible in order to allow 
lawful access to such communications.  
3.2.3 Production order 
 Production orders are also pertinent to encryption. A production order is an 
investigatory regime introduced in the Search and Surveillance Act 2012.59 Pursuant to a 
production order, a person must provide ‘any documents described in the order that are in his 
or her possession or control, and to disclose to the best of his or her knowledge or belief the 
location of any documents not in his or her possession of control’.60 Productions order are 
generally applicable to documents and other recorded information (e.g., paper and electronic 
documents, subscriber information and metadata),61 and are mainly used by law enforcement 
officers to officially request documents about individuals from businesses that regularly 
collect data such as customer records.62 The coverage of documents that may be subject to a 
production order is quite broad and can include ‘disks and data storage devices, and any 
material by means of which information is supplied to a device used for recording, storing or 
processing information’.63  
                                                        
58 ibid s 24(4)(b). 
59 Law Commission (n 30), para 14.1. 
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 Despite the broad scope of production orders, the use of encryption may diminish 
their efficacy. A person subject to a production order is only required to produce existing 
documents and data in their possession or control and there is no legal obligation to decrypt 
any encrypted documents. This means that while law enforcement officers may be able to 
obtain encrypted documents and data from a person or service provider these may be of little 
evidentiary value since they are in an unintelligible or readable format. Encryption though is 
less of a hindrance when it comes to non-content data such as subscriber data, traffic data and 
other metadata. These forms of data are much harder to conceal or keep private even with the 
use of encryption. Moreover, these data are generally in the possession or control of the 
service provider rather than the end user. Subscriber information is especially useful in 
criminal investigations because it can help disclose or determine the suspect’s identity, 
location and activities. Furthermore, production orders may be used to secure a particular 
kind of access information: encryption and decryption keys. These keys are random strings of 
information (e.g., a mix of letters, numbers and other symbols) that are normally saved or 
stored digitally as computer files but can also be printed on paper. Since generated encryption 
and decryption keys fall within the meaning of documents, they can be the subject of 
production orders. Law enforcement officers may therefore require persons and service 
providers to produce their keys or disclose the keys’ location. Given the criticality of 
encryption and decryption keys to preserving the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of 
encrypted data, the authority to compel the disclosure of such keys is a powerful measure 
available to law enforcement. 
4. Human rights and cybersecurity laws 
 4.1 Human rights laws 
 The laws relating to law enforcement discussed in the preceding part are intimately 
connected to two types of law that are also relevant to encryption: human rights laws and 
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cybersecurity laws. This is confirmed in the express purpose of the Search and Surveillance 
Act 2012, which states: ‘the investigation and prosecution of offences’ must be done ‘in a 
manner that is consistent with human rights values’.64 The law enforcement powers and 
procedures in the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 and other enactments must therefore be 
read together with the rights and principles in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA) and related laws and cases.  
 4.1.1 Right against unreasonable search and seizure (including surveillance)  
The right against unreasonable search and seizure provides an essential 
counterbalance to the search, seizure and surveillance powers. Section 21 of the NZBORA 
provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, 
whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise’.65 This right applies ‘not 
only to acts of physical trespass but to any circumstances where state intrusion on an 
individual’s privacy in this way is unjustified’.66 It includes ‘not only to the interception of 
mail… but also to the electronic interception of private conversations and other forms of 
surveillance’.67 Reference to ‘correspondence’ means secrecy of communications is also 
protected under this right. Section 21 offers broad protection and is applicable to warranted 
and warrantless searches, surveillance device warrants, and production orders. This means 
that the right against unreasonable search and seizure provides crucial legal protection against 
any unreasonable search, seizure or surveillance of encrypted devices, data or 
communications conducted pursuant to the law enforcement powers and procedures 
discussed in the preceding part. Pursuant to this right, a person subject to a search, seizure or 
                                                        
64 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 5 (emphasis added). 
65 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21. 
66 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis 
2015) 904. 
67 ibid 904. 
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surveillance can question the reasonableness and lawfulness of law enforcement actions and 
investigations. 
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is intimately connected to the 
concept of reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court explained that reasonable 
expectation of privacy is:  
directed at protecting a ‘biographical core of personal information which 
individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control 
from dissemination by the state’ and includes information ‘which tends to reveal 
intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual’. 68  
 
Reasonable expectation of privacy is comprised to two limbs. First, the person complaining 
of a breach must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the place or thing being 
searched, or time of the police activity. Second, that expectation must be one that society is 
prepared to recognise as reasonable.69 If both limbs are met, then section 21 of the NZBORA 
applies.  
Searches of computers and other electronic devices ‘raise special privacy concerns, 
because of the nature and extent of the information that they hold’.70 When assessing the 
significance of privacy interests, outward signs of an increased subjective expectation of 
privacy needs to be taken into account. For instance, an electronic device with a PIN lock 
indicates a higher subjective expectation of privacy.71 The focus of the second limb is on the 
inherent privacy of the area or thing being searched or observed.72 The second limb is also ‘a 
contextual one, requiring consideration of the particular circumstances of the case’.73 
Therefore, encrypted devices or data are only supposed to be seen by those who hold the 
access information. When encryption is applied to or used on an electronic device, data 
                                                        
68 R v Alsford [2017] NZSC 42 [63]. 
69 See Butler and Butler (n 66) 936. 
70 Dotcom v AG [2014] NZSC 199 [191]; see Law Commission (n 30), para 12.9. 
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storage device, or a file or folder on such device, this should be taken as an indication that 
there is an increased subjective expectation of privacy. It is also likely that this heightened 
subjective expectation would be reasonable, and society would be prepared to recognise the 
expectation of privacy exhibited in encrypted information.  
In case a search, seizure or surveillance is deemed unreasonable by a court, then the 
evidence may be considered improperly obtained.74 Whether the evidence obtained through 
an unreasonable search is admissible in court is determined under section 30 of the Evidence 
Act 2006.75 The court decides on the balance of probabilities whether the evidence was 
improperly obtained, and then determines whether exclusion of that evidence is proportionate 
to the impropriety.76 
 4.1.2 Privilege against self-incrimination 
 The privilege or right against self-incrimination also acts as a crucial safeguard to the 
use of law enforcement powers in relation to encryption. The privilege is provided for in the 
Evidence Act 2006. Self-incrimination is defined in the Act as ‘the provision of information 
that could reasonably lead to, or increase the likelihood of, the prosecution of that person for 
a criminal office’.77 Section 60 of the Evidence Act 2006 sets out the extent of the privilege. 
It states:  
(a) a person [cannot be] required to provide specific information –  
 
(i) in the course of a proceeding; or 
(ii) by a person exercising a statutory power or duty; or 
(iii) by a Police officer or other person holding a public office in the course of an  
investigation into a criminal offence or possible criminal offence; and 
 
(b) the information would, if so provided, be likely to incriminate the person 
under New Zealand law for an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment.78 
 
                                                        
74 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(5)(a). 
75 ibid s 30. 
76 ibid s 30(2). 
77 ibid s 4. 
78 ibid s 60(1)(a-b). 
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Subsection (2) of section 60 further provides that ‘the person… cannot be prosecuted or 
penalised for refusing or failing to provide the information, whether or not the person claimed 
the privilege when the person refused or failed to provide the information’.79  
The core principle underlying this privilege is that the state cannot require persons to 
provide information which may expose them to incurring a criminal penalty.80 The privilege 
against self-incrimination ‘presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove 
their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of 
coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused’.81 This is in line with the 
common law rule that ‘no person can be forced to make an incriminating statement against 
his or her will’.82 Furthermore, ‘at common law the right to refuse to answer incriminatory 
questions embraces not just answers to oral interrogation, but also requests for the production 
of documentation (including pre-existing documents) and any other incriminating 
evidence’.83 The privilege includes the right ‘to decline to produce pre-existing documentary 
material’, which may be interpreted as including access information.84 
 As with any right or privilege, the privilege against self-incrimination is not absolute 
and is subject to reasonable limitations and conditions as prescribed by law. It is possible for 
laws to impose an obligation on a person to provide information while also expressly 
retaining the privilege against self-incrimination.85 The previously cited section 130 of the 
Search and Surveillance Act 2012 is an example of this. Subsections (1) and (3) of section 
130 impose an obligation on a person to provide access information if required by law 
enforcement officers as part of a search and seizure.86 However, subsections (2) and (4) 
                                                        
79 ibid s 60(2)(b). 
80 Law Commission, The Privilege against Self-Incrimination (NZLC PP25, 1996), para 1. 
81 Butler and Butler (n 66) 1436. 
82 ibid 1437.  
83 ibid. 
84 ibid 1439. 
85 Law Commission (n 80) para 6. 
86 Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 130(1). 
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explicitly and by implication affirm the privilege against self-incrimination in computer 
system searches.87 This interpretation is in accord with section 60 of the Evidence Act 2006, 
which provides that the privilege against self-incrimination applies: 
(a) unless an enactment removes the privilege against self-incrimination either 
expressly or by necessary implication; and 
(b) to the extent that an enactment does not expressly or by necessary 
implication remove the privilege against self-incrimination.88 
 
Legal experts are similarly of the view that: 
the definition of ‘self-incrimination’ in s 4 of the Evidence Act 2006 refers to 
information ‘that could reasonably lead to, or increase the likelihood of,… 
prosecution’. Arguably, access information or information as to the whereabouts 
would meet that definition if the fact that the person had that information 
established the link between him or her and the evidential material. In that 
event… the person may not be required to provide the information.89 
  
In general, the above-cited laws do not distinguish between physical and electronic searches 
of tangible versus intangible evidence. The privilege against self-incrimination can apply in 
all of these cases. The privilege then provides a legal basis for persons suspected of or 
charged with a crime to lawfully refuse to provide passwords and other access information to 
encrypted data and devices as part of a computer system search under section 130 of the 
Search and Surveillance Act 2012 if doing so would reasonably lead to and increase the 
likelihood of their prosecution. The privilege against self-incrimination offers robust 
protection as it safeguards persons from being coerced against their will to decrypt or provide 
access to encrypted information that can be used against them in a criminal proceeding.  
 4.1.3 Other rights  
Freedom of expression is another right that is pertinent to encryption. This right can 
be exercised as a negative action or as inaction: ‘freedom of expression encompasses the 
right not to express an opinion or information’.90 It thus includes the freedom not to speak, 
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which is closely connected to the so-called silence immunities such as the right to silence, 
privilege against self-incrimination, and right not to be compelled to be a witness or to 
confess guilt.91 In relation to encryption, a person can assert his or her right not to speak 
when asked to provide information including passwords and other access information as part 
of a search. Freedom of expression is also significant to encryption when this right is 
expressed in a positive manner. This freedom protects a person’s right to communicate in 
codes and ciphers.92 It further guarantee a person’s ability to write code (i.e., encryption 
software or cryptographic algorithms), which are considered protected forms of expression .93  
The right to privacy is another right that is often mentioned together with encryption. 
It is essential to point out that, while specific rights to privacy have been recognised in case 
law and the Privacy Act 2020,94 there is no general right to privacy in New Zealand.95 While 
other jurisdictions have interpreted the existence of an independent, separate or standalone 
right to privacy based on or as an essential part of their Bill of Rights (specifically, the right 
against unreasonable search and seizure), this has not been done in the country. Despite the 
absence of a general right that offers broad privacy protection, it is possible to claim specific 
privacy protections under section 21 of the NZBORA and case law.  
 4.2 Information security and data protection laws 
 4.2.1 Data protection  
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 In spite of the absence of a general right to privacy in New Zealand, the narrower area 
of informational privacy or data protection is protected under the Privacy Act 2020. The 
Privacy Act 2020 generally follows and conforms to the overarching approach and principles 
of the EU General Data Protection Regulation.96 While the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation only applies to New Zealand companies doing business in the EU or are 
processing personal data of people in that region, the Regulation and its implementation by 
Data Protection Authorities and interpretation in case law in the EU may provide persuasive 
guidance to New Zealand courts and authorities, particularly the Privacy Commissioner.  
The Privacy Act 2020 is principally concerned with the protection of a person’s 
specific ‘right to privacy of personal information’ – in other words, data protection.97 
Personal information is defined broadly to mean information about an identifiable 
individual.98 The Privacy Act 2020 sets out general Information Privacy Principles (IPP) 
relating to the collection, use and disclosure of personal information held by agencies (i.e., 
data controllers and data processors), and the access of individuals to ascertain and correct 
the information held about them by an agency.99 The most pertinent IPP relating to 
encryption is IPP 5, regarding the storage and security of personal information.100 This is 
similar to the principle of integrity and confidentiality in the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation.101 Essentially, this principle requires an agency to ensure that the information 
they hold is protected and secured by such security safeguards as it is reasonable in the 
circumstances to take. Assessing what is reasonable in the circumstance depends on the 
sensitivity or confidentiality of the information involved and what safeguards could have 
                                                        
96 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
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been put in place to protect that information.102 An agency also has an ongoing responsibility 
to develop and maintain appropriate security safeguards for their information.103 
 With regard to the role of and use of encryption for securing personal information, the 
Privacy Commissioner does appear to require that data must be encrypted to be stored on a 
cloud service,104 and that data physically transmitted between New Zealand government 
departments must be encrypted when being transferred.105 In these cases, encryption helps 
provide greater security and privacy protection to personal information. The Privacy 101 
workbooks published by the Commissioner as part of their online learning tools only 
mentions encryption as something that an agency may consider when transmitting 
information.106 
 4.2.2 Industry-specific regulation and government information security standards 
The Privacy Commissioner is authorised under the Privacy Act 2020 to issue codes of 
practise that become part of the law.107 These codes modify the operation of the Privacy Act 
2020 for specific industries. Three such codes that involve IPP 5 are: (1) 
Telecommunications Information Privacy Code; (2) Credit Reporting Privacy Code; and (3) 
Health Information Privacy Code.108 These codes do not alter IPP 5 in any significant way. 
However, the first two concern industries where the use of encryption has long been a 
default. In 2017, the Ministry of Health published the Health Information Governance 
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Guidelines, which provided information on policies and procedures that must be 
implemented for a health provider to meet its legal obligation regarding health information.109 
These guidelines require a health provider to comply with the Health Information Security 
Framework,110 which contains detailed reference to cryptography.111 Most significantly, this 
framework requires that a health provider establish and document a cryptographic policy by 
adopting or adapting the Protective Security Requirements and the New Zealand Information 
Security Manual (NZISM) as a security baseline.112 Furthermore, when building a risk 
profile, a health provider must consider upgradeable solutions so that encryption protocols 
and algorithms can be upgradable over a system’s lifetime and, when decommissioning, 
ensuring the encryption keys used cannot be compromised.113 
 The NZ Government is also concerned about information security and data protection 
and it recognises the key role that encryption plays in preserving them. It has published 
guidelines on the IPPs, which suggest that an agency should ask itself if the information is 
protected by reasonable safeguards.114 The Government has also provided advice that an 
agency should check to see what security requirements apply since some agencies (public 
service departments and selected others) fall within the scope of the Protective Security 
Requirements.115 The NZ Government itself is required to adhere to the NZISM,116 which 
contains a detailed chapter on cryptography and how it should be implemented in the New 
Zealand context.117 The NZISM recognises the importance of encryption to information 
security and data protection when it states that: 
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Encryption is primarily used to provide confidentiality protecting against the 
risk of information being exploited by an attacker. More broadly, cryptography 
can also provide authentication, non-repudiation and integrity. Cryptography is 
also used in the establishment of secure connectivity.118 
 
The NZISM explicitly requires the use and implementation of encryption in cases where 
‘data is transmitted between data centres over insecure or unprotected networks such as the 
Internet, public infrastructure or non-agency controlled networks’ or when agencies ‘wish to 
communicate over insecure or unprotected networks such as the Internet, public networks or 
non-agency controlled networks’.119 
 It is evident from the above discussion that the security and protection of computer 
systems and personal information are major concerns of both public and private actors. 
Government, private individuals and entities are keenly aware that encryption is crucial for 
ensuring the information security and data protection of their computers, data and networks.  
5. Proposed regulation of end-to-end encryption  
 Based on the foregoing discussion, the applicable laws and legal framework of 
encryption in New Zealand can be used to assess the legitimacy and viability of the proposal 
by members of the Five Eyes alliance to regulate the use of end-to-end encryption in 
messaging services. The proposal is broadly stated and sparse on details as to what sort of 
regulation it will be and what legal obligations it will impose. Regardless of this, the proposal 
can be evaluated based on the general or likely regulatory approaches that the government 
will consider, namely: (a) encryption ban or prohibition; (b) regulation of encryption keys; 
and (c) mandated backdoors and weakening of encryption.120 While the foregoing are non-
exclusive, they are common approaches that governments have proposed to regulate 
encryption over the past decades.121  
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5.1 Encryption ban or prohibition  
 A prohibition or ban on the use of end-to-end encryption in messaging services and 
apps such as Signal, Telegram or WhatsApp may appear prima facie too extreme or 
unworkable,122 but this has not prevented other countries from proposing or actually banning 
these apps.123 Telegram has been banned in Russia, China and Iran.124 The United Kingdom 
and the European Union have considered restricting the use of end-to-end encryption.125 In 
the New Zealand context, a ban on encrypted messaging apps or a prohibition against these 
apps from implementing end-to-end encryption would be unprecedented and infeasible.126 
Further, it would not be in accord with the existing laws of encryption. Most popular 
messaging services are developed and provided by international companies with headquarters 
outside of New Zealand. Export control laws do not apply since these messaging apps and 
services are imported, downloaded and used in, rather than exported out of, the country.  
Substantive cybercrime laws also do not support a prohibition or ban on end-to-end 
encryption in the New Zealand. In general, the crime of misuse of devices does not apply to 
dual-use technologies like encryption. It is only a crime if the sole or principal purpose of 
encryption is to commit an offence.127 Thus, unless an encrypted messaging service is 
primarily or specifically designed or promoted for the commission of a crime, developers and 
users are generally free to develop, distribute, possess or use these messaging apps within the 
country.  
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A ban or a prohibition against the use of encryption in messaging services can also 
negatively impact and potentially infringe freedom of expression.128 As discussed in Part 4, 
users have a right to speak in code or a secret language. Furthermore, the encryption software 
that Signal uses to provide end-to-end encryption can deemed a protected form of written 
expression that may only be subjected to ‘reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.129 While the government may object 
to the uses of end-to-end encryption software, it is doubtful that the content or code of the 
encryption software itself would fall within any of the traditional or justified limitations to 
freedom of expression.130  
 5.2 Regulation of encryption keys 
 Another approach the government may pursue is to regulate the possession and 
control of encryption and decryption keys. It can seek to accomplish this in three main ways. 
First, it can require service providers to surrender their encryption and decryption keys as part 
of doing business in New Zealand. Second, it can impose a mandatory key escrow scheme 
where encryption and decryption keys are deposited with and held by a trusted third party. 
Third, the government can utilise a key disclosure law where specified persons can be 
compelled to produce their keys in specific situations.  
The first two ways (encryption key surrender and key escrow) do not appear to be 
workable since they introduce exceedingly difficult problems such as reduced information 
security, new risks and vulnerabilities (e.g., the trusted party becomes a prime target of 
cyberattacks), unwanted complexity and unreliability in information systems, and increased 
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costs for users and providers.131 While it is true that, under TICSA, network operators and 
service providers may be required to decrypt communications if they provided the means of 
encryption, when it comes to end-to-end encryption, the decryption keys are held by users. 
This means that the government would need to demand the keys from individual users.  
Key disclosure is the third way to regulate encryption keys. As explained in Part 3, 
law enforcement officers already have this power under section 130 of the Search and 
Surveillance Act 2012 and section 228 of the Customs and Excise Act 2018.132 Users and 
providers of encrypted messaging apps and services may be obligated to reasonably provide 
necessary information including encryption and decryption keys and access information as 
part of a search or seizure. Of course, as discussed in Part 4, this power is subject to the 
privilege against self-incrimination, right against unreasonable search and seizure, and other 
legal rights.133 It is a legal principle that persons cannot be compelled to make statements or 
provide information if these would violate their human or civil rights. Any proposed 
broadening or expansion of this authority to demand decryption (e.g., exclusion of the 
privilege against self-incrimination in cases of terrorism or child pornography) is legally 
objectionable134 and democratically suspect on human rights grounds. 
 5.3 Mandated backdoors and weakening of encryption  
 Backdoors in encryption is a frequently mentioned government proposal.135 
Encryption backdoors and proposals for so-called ghost protocols136 result in compromised or 
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weakened encryption. From a technical standpoint, creating a backdoor in encryption would 
be tantamount to introducing a security vulnerability or zero-day flaw into a computer 
system.137 The resulting impaired or diminished security potentially exposes people to 
increased and undue risks and threats to their information security and data privacy. 
Cryptographers, cybersecurity experts and legal scholars have long pointed out the inherent 
problems and disastrous consequences of backdoors and other attempts to weaken 
encryption.138 Mandatory backdoors therefore do not appear to be a viable option because 
they go against the very purpose of encryption, which is to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity and authenticity of data.139  
Moreover, the mandated use of backdoored or weakened encryption may result in 
providers and businesses being in breach of their data protection and information security 
obligations as required by the Privacy Act 2020.140 With respect to the government, since its 
very own information security manual requires the use of strong encryption in its systems and 
communications, it would be very strange and troublesome indeed if private individuals and 
entities are required to use insecure messaging services while the government has access to 
full end-to-end encryption.  
In addition, as explained in Part 3, law enforcement officers already have extensive 
powers and procedures available to them to gain access to encrypted computers, data and 
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communications. Rather than requiring backdoors in end-to-end encryption, law enforcement 
officers are better off using their existing powers and improving their digital investigation 
and forensic tools and techniques.141 It may also be possible for the government to obtain a 
declaratory order from a court confirming that the use of hacking techniques by law 
enforcement is reasonable and legally permissible.142  
The oft-cited Apple v FBI case (where the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
sought a court order to compel Apple to create a modified version of its smartphone operating 
system to allow access to the San Bernardino shooter’s locked iPhone)143 has shown that law 
enforcement authorities do not need backdoors to access encrypted devices and data of 
suspects or persons charged with crimes since they can gain access in other ways. A 
subsequent US Department of Justice report came to the conclusion that the FBI’s request on 
Apple to create a backdoor was unwarranted given that the law enforcement agency should 
have first exhausted other available methods and means.144 It has been confirmed that the FBI 
was able to break into the shooter’s locked iPhone with the assistance of an Australian 
cybersecurity firm.145 Currently, there are devices such as GrayKey that are being sold to law 
enforcement authorities to unlock encrypted iPhones.146 The Apple v FBI case and its after-
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effects illustrate why backdoors in encryption are not only technically and legally 
problematic, but also unnecessary.  
It is evident that the proposed regulation of end-to-end encryption in messaging 
services is incongruous with the existing laws and legal framework of encryption in New 
Zealand and should not be pursued. 
6. Encryption legal framework  
 As this article has explained, there are a number of existing laws that apply to and 
regulate encryption in New Zealand. The export of encryption technologies is regulated by 
export control rules, while the development and implementation of encryption is subject to 
substantive cybercrime laws. Pursuant to criminal procedure laws, law enforcement officers 
already possess significant powers and measures to deal with or get around encryption. Using 
search and seizure powers, they can conduct searches and gain access to encrypted data and 
devices. Law enforcement officers also have the authority to require reasonable assistance 
from third parties including the ability to compel disclosure of access information such as 
encryption keys from persons subject to or involved in a search. Law enforcement officers 
can likewise utilise use surveillance powers to intercept and collect encrypted 
communications. Furthermore, telecommunications service providers have a duty to provide 
reasonable assistance to law enforcement in carrying out surveillance operations, and 
network operators and service providers can be required to provide content data, traffic data 
and other metadata as part of surveillance operations. 
Such law enforcement powers and procedures that apply to encryption though are not 
absolute and they are carefully checked and counterbalanced by protections offered by 
human rights and cybersecurity laws. Human rights such as the right against unreasonable 
search and seizure, privilege against self-incrimination and even freedom of expression 
provide significant legal protections to the development, access to and use of encryption. 
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There are also pertinent cybersecurity laws and policies that promote the use of encryption to 
ensure information security and data protection.  
The above laws constitute an overarching legal framework that controls and regulates 
encryption. It is crucial then to be cognisant of these laws to gain a better understanding of 
what rules actually apply to encryption. The laws and legal framework of encryption are not 
unique to New Zealand. Comparable laws and a similar legal framework exist in the member 
countries of the Five Eyes alliance as well as in other states. It is therefore key for any legal 
proposal to regulate encryption, whether in New Zealand or in other jurisdictions, to be 
evaluated against this or an equivalent encryption legal framework. Even though encryption 
is a complex technology that appears difficult to control, it is subject to multiple laws and 
regulations. 
 
